Abstract
This article seeks to determine both the meaning and scope of the constitutional hermeneutic rule established in the second paragraph of Article 93 of the Constitution and the meaning and scope, through the application of this hermeneutic rule, of the right to challenge a conviction, provided for in the fourth paragraph of Article 29 of the Constitution. To this end, the distinction is made between this right and the right to a second hearing recognized in Art. 31 of the Constitution; a hypothesis is proposed on what should be understood as interpretation of the rights and duties recognized in the Constitution in accordance with the international treaties on human rights ratified by Colombia In addition, hypothetical scenarios are presented as necessary to capture the nuances provided by the Colombian legal system for the exercise of this right; the exercise of the referred right in each scenario is analyzed, with the difficulties that follow from the legislator's omission of its duty to regulate it and the effects given to the decision of unenforceability in Judgment C-792 of 2014; and it is concluded that, being a fundamental constitutional right, its interpretation must be made in accordance with the pro homine principle, so that it is as broad as possible and, thanks to the principles of equality and favorability, its exercise must be regulated by law and cannot be limited in time, based on a milestone other than its recognition by the Constitution or by an international treaty that is part of the block of constitutionality.