Not the Exception, but the Pattern: Autocratization from Within in Hungary and Turkey

Abstract

Contemporary democracies rarely die through coups d'état or abrupt ruptures. Today they erode gradually, through legal and electoral mechanisms used by democratically elected leaders who concentrate power while dismantling institutional checks. This article analyzes that process, and examines the way in which autocratization from within manifests itself through the cases of Hungary under Viktor Orbán and Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of Nancy Bermeo, Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt, and Anna L¨uhrmann and Staffan Lindberg, the article identifies three central mechanisms through which democratic backsliding operates, including institutional capture, discursive resignification, and the legalization of incumbent advantage. The central argument is that what makes these cases significant is not their exceptionality but their replicability. The dynamic of autocratization from within has spread beyond Hungary and Turkey, and represents a systemic threat to contemporary democratic governance.